Import UAPF package: lv-civdef-drone-threat-public-address (1).uapf

README.md

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+# lv.civdef.drone-threat-public-address
+
+**UAPF Level-4 process package — v0.2.0 (draft)**
+**Conformant to UAPF specification v2.2.0** — see `docs/04-validation-report.md`.
+
+Drone Threat Public Address & Citizen Notification — a process model of the
+cross-institutional algorithm for detecting a drone threat over Latvian
+airspace, deciding on and triggering public cell-broadcast notification,
+coordinating interception, and conducting field response and origin
+investigation.
+
+Built from the public record of the 7 May 2026 Rēzekne drone incident and the
+Ministry of Defence commitment to revise the inter-institutional notification
+algorithms. **Not approved for operational use** (`lifecycle.status: draft`).
+
+## Layout
+
+```
+lv-civdef-drone-threat-public-address/
+├── uapf.yaml                                  # manifest (kind: uapf.package, level 4)
+├── bpmn/
+│   └── drone-threat-public-address.bpmn       # end-to-end process flow
+├── dmn/
+│   └── air-threat-decisions.dmn               # 3 decisions: severity / scope / interception
+├── cmmn/
+│   └── field-response-investigation.cmmn      # field-response & origin-investigation case
+├── resources/
+│   ├── mappings.yaml                          # 11 targets, 19 bindings
+│   └── guardrails.yaml                        # UAPF-IP guardrails policy snapshot
+├── metadata/
+│   ├── ownership.yaml
+│   ├── lifecycle.yaml
+│   └── policies.yaml                          # classification / execution / delegation
+└── docs/                                      # non-normative supporting analysis
+    ├── 00-incident-chronology.md
+    ├── 01-institutional-gap-analysis.md
+    ├── 02-raci.md
+    ├── 03-uapf-ip-integration.md
+    └── 04-validation-report.md
+```
+
+## Cornerstones
+
+- **BPMN** `Process_DroneThreatPublicAddress` — detection → threat assessment →
+  gateway → broadcast-scope decision → request → parallel block
+  {cell broadcast | agency notification | interception evaluation} →
+  synchronise → local response → all-clear → field-response case → close.
+- **DMN** one DRD, three decisions — `Decision_AirThreatSeverity`,
+  `Decision_CellBroadcastScope`, `Decision_InterceptionAuthorization`.
+- **CMMN** `Case_DroneIncidentFieldResponse` — debris search, fire suppression,
+  scene security, an investigation stage (technical exam, origin attribution,
+  disinformation monitoring), plus discretionary press and after-action review.
+- **Resources** 11 targets (NBS surveillance/Joint Staff/air-defence, VUGD duty
+  and cell-broadcast system, State Police, KVC, Ministry of Defence, municipal
+  commissions, an AI threat-assessment agent, an OSINT MCP tool) bound to every
+  process / decision / case element via the v2.2.0 resource-mapping schema.
+
+## UAPF-IP & MCP
+
+The manifest declares `requires_capabilities`, `profiles_supported`
+(`uapf-ip-orchestrated`, `uapf-ip-sync-decision`), `guardrails`, and an
+`exposure.mcp` block exposing the process and the three decisions as MCP tools.
+See `docs/03-uapf-ip-integration.md`.
+
+## Validation
+
+```
+python3 ../../validate.py ../.. <path-to-UAPF-specification-repo>
+```
+
+Result: PASS, 0 errors, 0 warnings against UAPF v2.2.0. The reference CLI
+`tools/uapf-cli/uapf.py` will wrongly reject this package because it checks for
+the obsolete `.bpmn.xml` extension — this is a known upstream bug, documented in
+`docs/04-validation-report.md`.
+
+## Intended steward
+
+Authored as an external draft (owner: Rihards Gailums). The intended
+institutional steward on hand-over is the Ministry of Defence
+(Aizsardzības ministrija) jointly with the Crisis Management Centre
+(Krīzes vadības centrs).
+
+## Sources
+
+Public reporting only — LSM / eng.lsm.lv, Apollo, TV3, Meduza, Defense News,
+The Globe and Mail, and the Wikipedia article "2026 Ukrainian drone incursions
+into Baltic states". Dated record in `docs/00-incident-chronology.md`.