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docs/03-notification-timing-sla.md
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docs/03-notification-timing-sla.md
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# 03 — Notification Timing & SLA Model
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The 7 May 2026 incident's defining failure was a **~40-minute** gap between a
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visible air threat and the public cell-broadcast reaching Rezekne. This package
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treats notification speed as a **first-class, modelled quantity** rather than an
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implicit expectation.
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## The SLA chain
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1. `Decision_NotificationUrgency` takes `threatLevel` and the estimated minutes
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until the object could reach people, and outputs:
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- `notificationTier` — `immediate | priority | standard | none`
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- `broadcastSlaSeconds` — the **maximum** time allowed from authorisation to
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confirmed dispatch.
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2. `Task_DispatchBroadcast` (VUGD) carries a **non-interrupting boundary timer**
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armed at `broadcastSlaSeconds`.
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3. If dispatch is not confirmed before the timer fires, `Task_EscalateSla`
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runs **in parallel** — it does not cancel the broadcast, it escalates the
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delay to the Crisis Management Centre so a human intervenes.
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## Proposed SLA defaults
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| Threat level | Lead time | Tier | `broadcastSlaSeconds` | Rationale |
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|--------------|-----------|------|----------------------:|-----------|
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| critical | any | immediate | 120 | Object inside airspace, closing on people. |
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| high | ≤ 15 min | immediate | 180 | Little lead time; alert must precede impact. |
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| high | > 15 min | priority | 300 | Lead time exists; brief verification window. |
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| elevated | any | priority | 600 | Threat present, not yet tracking toward people. |
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| low | any | standard | 1800 | Advisory only. |
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| none | – | none | 0 | No public broadcast. |
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Against these defaults, the Rezekne broadcast (~2400 s) breached even the most
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lenient non-zero SLA **by an order of magnitude**. Under this model the boundary
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timer would have fired at 120–180 s and escalated to KVC ~38 minutes earlier.
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## Guardrail
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`broadcastSlaSeconds` is a **hard floor for escalation, not a target for
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dispatch** (guardrail GR-3). Dispatch should normally be far faster; the SLA is
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the line past which the absence of a broadcast becomes its own incident.
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## Open for validation
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The table values are **modelling proposals**. They need calibration against
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real NBS classification timelines and VUGD cell-broadcast dispatch latencies
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before the package can leave `draft`.
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