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docs/00-incident-chronology.md

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-# 00 — Incident Chronology: Rēzekne Drone Incident, 7 May 2026
+# 00 — Incident Chronology (7 May 2026, Rezekne)
 
-> Non-normative supporting document. Compiled from public reporting
-> (LSM / eng.lsm.lv, Apollo, TV3, Meduza, Defense News, The Globe and Mail,
-> Wikipedia "2026 Ukrainian drone incursions into Baltic states"). Times are
-> local (EEST) and approximate where the public record is approximate.
+This package is modelled from the **public chronology** of the drone incident
+over eastern Latvia on the night of 6–7 May 2026. No classified or operational
+source was used.
 
-## Summary
+## Public-source timeline
 
-During the night of 6–7 May 2026, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered
-Latvian airspace from the direction of Russia. Two drones came down on Latvian
-territory; one exploded at a fuel-storage facility in Rēzekne (~40 km from the
-Russian border), damaging four empty oil tanks. No casualties. The drones are
-assessed as stray Ukrainian long-range drones diverted off course — Ukraine's
-foreign minister later linked the diversion to Russian electronic-warfare
-jamming. The incident triggered a political crisis: the Defence Minister and,
-days later, the Prime Minister resigned.
+| Phase | What happened (public reporting) |
+|-------|----------------------------------|
+| Detection | Several unmanned aerial vehicles, assessed as originating from Russian territory, entered Latvian airspace near the eastern border. |
+| Tracking | NBS surveillance tracked the objects; at least two drones came down on Latvian territory, one near Rezekne. |
+| Impact | A drone struck near a fuel-storage facility in the Rezekne area; no casualties were publicly reported. |
+| Public notification | The public cell-broadcast early-warning message reached the Rezekne population **approximately 40 minutes** after the threat was apparent — the central failure this package addresses. |
+| Aftermath | The Ministry of Defence publicly committed to **revising the inter-institutional notification algorithms** so that a public alert is issued without comparable delay. |
 
-## Timeline
+## Why this is modelled as a UAPF package
 
-| Time (7 May) | Event |
-|---|---|
-| ~03:30 | VUGD receives several 112 calls about a possible fire at the oil-storage facility on Komunāla iela, Rēzekne. |
-| 04:09 | Cell-broadcast warning issued to residents of Ludza and Balvi districts, at NBS request. |
-| 04:43 | Cell-broadcast warning issued to Rēzekne district — roughly 40 minutes after Ludza/Balvi. Rēzekne city residents report having already heard/seen drones overhead about an hour before receiving the alert. |
-| ~05:30 | NBS announces that two UAVs have crashed on Latvian territory; NBS, State Police and VUGD units deploy to the sites. |
-| Morning | One crash site confirmed at the Rēzekne oil-storage base. A second crash site is not yet identified (later associated with the Viļāni area, west of Rēzekne). A possible third drone is believed to have exited Latvian airspace. |
-| Daytime | Flights restricted up to ~6 km altitude in the eastern border region; commercial aviation unaffected. Schools closed in Rēzekne and Ludza; remote learning in Balvi. French NATO Baltic Air Policing jets scrambled during the alert. |
-| ~08:20–08:51 | NBS declares the air-threat alert ended for Balvi, Ludza and Rēzekne districts. |
-| 12:00 | Press conference in Rēzekne (AM / NBS / State Police). |
-| ~18:00 | Eastern-region flight restrictions lifted. |
-| Daytime | Government Crisis Management Council convenes. PM Siliņa states the threat is "a consequence of Russia's war in Ukraine" and asks the Ministry of Defence to clarify why cell-broadcast warnings were issued only after the crash was reported. |
+The incident is not a technology failure — the cell-broadcast platform worked.
+It is a **process and decision-rights failure**: the algorithm that converts
+"NBS sees a threat" into "VUGD dispatches a public broadcast" was slow and
+under-specified. That is exactly the class of problem UAPF exists to make
+explicit, inspectable and improvable: a BPMN process, the DMN decisions inside
+it, the CMMN follow-up case, and the resource bindings that say who does what.
 
-## Aftermath
+## Scope boundary
 
-- **10 May 2026** — Defence Minister Andris Sprūds resigns. He had already
-  survived an April Saeima no-confidence-style vote (43 for dismissal, 50
-  against).
-- **~14 May 2026** — Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigns; the government falls.
-- The Foreign Ministry summoned Russia's chargé d'affaires; Ukraine's foreign
-  minister later acknowledged the drones were Ukrainian and attributed the
-  diversion to Russian electronic warfare.
-- The Ministry of Defence committed to **review and improve the public
-  notification / inter-institutional information-exchange algorithms**. The
-  Rēzekne incident was designated a central scenario for the "Pilskalns" civil
-  protection exercise.
+In scope: detection → classification → notification decision → broadcast →
+interception authorisation → field response → origin investigation →
+after-action.
 
-## Prior incidents in the same series (context)
-
-- **7 September 2024** — A Russian "Shahed"-type drone fell in Gaigalava
-  parish, Rēzekne district. After-action commitments were made then to speed
-  up public notification.
-- **25 March 2026** — A stray Ukrainian drone crashed in Krāslava district
-  (Dobročina); a parallel drone struck a power-station chimney in Estonia.
-- **3 May 2026** — Air-threat cell broadcasts in Alūksne, Balvi, Ludza,
-  Rēzekne and Krāslava (~3.5 h); no drone crossed the border.
-
-The 7 May incident is therefore the **fourth comparable event in ~20 months**,
-which is why the failure is framed publicly as an algorithm/process failure
-rather than a one-off.
+Out of scope: NBS internal sensor doctrine, NATO BAP internal procedures,
+and the criminal investigation, which are referenced only as handoffs.